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JEFFREY WAGNER*'

That Was Then and This Is Now: An
Economist's Wish List for the LLRW
Siting Paradigm
ABSTRACT

The prevailing low-level radioactivewaste disposalfacility-siting
paradigm has achieved very limited success, despite expensive
cooperative efforts undertaken across a number of states. The
authorinvestigates possible weaknesses in the paradigm'seconomic
foundationand analyzes the following aspects which appearto be
missing or underweighted: environmental and economic justice
issues, a common language through which affected parties can
precisely assert their arguments, a process of peer review, and a
strongfocus upon lifecycle volumetric capacity as a function of
willingness-to-accept and willingness-to-pay for new waste
management sites and technologies. The order in which concerns
are weighed is also evaluated.
I. INTRODUCTION

Agreeing upon new sites for low-level radioactive waste (LLRW)
management requires a multidisciplinary assessment of several scientific
concerns, including issues of social and economic import. It is possible to
roughly characterize the LLRW siting paradigm, as undertaken on an
international basis, as one that begins with broad geological and geographical evaluations, proceeds through a short list of candidate sites by
applying a range of criteria, and ends with a structure of bargaining
generally between the potential host communities adjacent to the "best
site" and the site management contractor.2
Under the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, states
are allowed to form interstate compacts to facilitate waste management on
* Jeffrey Wagner, Ph.D., is a Visiting Teaching Associate in the Department of
Agricultural and Consumer Economics, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana; this
paper was written while employed as the Radioactive Waste Project Coordinator at the
Central States Education Center, Champaign, IL, and a doctoral student in the Department
of Economics, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana.
1. The author is grateful to Clark Bullard and Rob Moore for valuable comments.
2. Typical siting criteria include geological and water properties, access to
transportation networks, and distance from wildlife areas. See, e.g., Illinois Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments, 420 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 20/10.2(b)
(West 1998); CHEM-NUCLEAR

SysTEs, INC., S80-PL-21, COMMUNrTY PARTNERING PLAN:
PENNSYLVANIA Low-LEVEL RADIOACTvE WAsTE DISPOSAL FAcILrrY 19-21 (Jan. 1996).
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a regional basis.' Some LLRW siting processes take place within an
interstate compact agreement while some states are in "go-alone" status
and determine their own LLRW siting processes. For example, the state of
Illinois is the host state for the Central Midwest Compact between Illinois
and Kentucky, and the final stage of site bargaining is mediated through
the regulatory body which will issue the site license-the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS).4
Since 1980, some modifications in the LLRW siting paradigm have
occurred which address the larger socioeconomic issues. Following the
initial search for new sites, the prevailing LLRW siting paradigm was
altered in two important ways: several interstate compact host states and
go-alone states embraced volunteer siting, and the payment of compensation to communities who participate in the siting process is built into more
siting processes.5
In the current State of Illinois LLRW siting paradigm, for example,
land must be proposed jointly by a landowner and the local community
(either a municipality, a collection of municipalities with shared borders,
or a county, depending on the proximity of the property to the neighboring
jurisdiction[s])." If the site management contractor cannot find a suitable
site on the list of volunteered properties, the LLRW siting process is to be
closed and reevaluated with respect to aspects of the siting process deemed
ineffective by the IDNS.7 Volunteer siting processes have now become
adopted by the Central Midwest Compact (Illinois and Kentucky),
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Massachusetts. Volunteer
siting programs are being evaluated in Michigan and New York, as well.'
A second change regards the appropriation of funding which
affected communities could use to freely participate in the process. The

3. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-573, § 4,94 Stat 3348
(1980) (amended 1985).

4. For example, Illinois law enables the IDNS to enter into community agreements
regarding various aspects of establishing, operating, and closing an LLRW facility. See Illinois
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments, 420 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
20/12.1(c) (West 1998). See § 10.3 for an example of the facility license application process.
5. See, e.g., Illinois Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments, 420
ILL. COMw. STAT. ANN. 12.1(a)-(b) (West 1998); CHEM-NUcLEAR SYSTEMS, INC., supranote 2, at
35-6.
6. Illinois Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments, 420 ILL COMP.
STAT. ANN. 20/10.2(c-3), (6) (West 1998).
7. See id. at § 10.2(g).
8. See Afton Associates, Inc., State of Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 6 Summary Report:
Low-Level RadioactiveWaste ManagementActivities In The States And Compacts 14-15 Oan. 1998).
A detailed volunteer program, including a compensation mechanism for addressing both
potential and actual host communities, is presented in CHEM-NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, INC., supra
note 2.
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funds, which are raised through fees assessed against waste generators,
pay for the timely dissemination of information throughout the community
in the form of public workshops and presentations during siting processes.
As well, funds may be allocated for expert consulting on a range of
pertinent issues. For example, the potential host community might seek
additional legal counsel regarding current state and federal siting laws, as
well as additional interpretation of scientific evidence as it becomes
available. The funding of affected community costs during the siting
process, as well as funding for additional compensation packages should
an agreement be reached, is built into a number of siting processes now.9
Notwithstanding these two positive changes in addressing the
socioeconomic elements of any LLRW siting process, difficult concerns
remain outside the paradigm or are addressed with a relatively low weight
as progress begins on the next round of siting efforts. While it is impossible
to satisfy every concern of every affected party to the siting process, there
are certain fundamentals of economics that cannot be ignored. Examining
the prevailing LLRW siting paradigm with regard to aspects that appear to
be missing or underweighted, the following aspects are notable: environmental and economic justice issues, a common language through which
affected parties can precisely assert their arguments, a process of peer
review, and a strong focus upon lifecycle volumetric capacity as a function
of willingness-to-accept and willingness-to-pay for new waste management
facilities.1' A second level of analysis regards the economic importance
attached to the ordering of decisions. The orderings in which the decisions
could be evaluated are more numerous than the decisions themselves; since
it is not immediately clear whether a particular ordering is optimal,
alternative orderings are proposed. The author argues not only that there
is no a prioribasis in economic theory for arranging the weighted decision
factors in the current order, but also that the current weighting and order

9. For an outline of the amendments to the Illinois Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Management Act of 1983, which created the community compensation mechanisms in Ilinois,
see ANNA VARI, PATRICIA REAGAN-CIR1NCIONE & JERYL L. MUMPOWER, LLRW DISPOSAL
FACILRIY SrrING: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN Six COUNTRIES 104-05 (1994).

10. Common language here refers to a standard terminology and mode of
decision-making. For example, the distinction between high-level and low-level radioactive
waste is sometimes blurred in policy discussions of the siting dilemma. An appropriate
economic model of the siting process, and the results one might obtain from the model,
requires a dear concept of the commodity to be allocated. For an analysis of optimal lifecycle
volumetric capacity as a function of the willingness-to-pay for and willingness-to-accept
low-level radioactive waste for management, see Jeffrey Wagner, The Optimal Allocation of
Radioactive Waste Between On-site and Off-site Management Alternatives, in Economic
Aspects of Radioactive Waste Management, University Manuscripts (forthcoming, on file with
author).
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produce undesirable effects upon the potential market for low-level
radioactive waste management.
II. UNDERWEIGHTED FACTORS IN THE LLRW SITING
PARADIGM
For any progress made on the engineering aspects of the siting
dilemma and proving the geological integrity of the particular site in
question, that progress will be eroded in the absence of sound economic
principles in the design of the siting process. Research clearly demonstrates
the unequal distribution of environmental hazards and potential hazards
from various pollutants across communities." The siting of a low-level
radioactive waste disposal facility likewise comprises well-known potential
hazards.' If potential stakeholders in the siting process have concerns over
the distribution of facilities handling radioactive materials-and they
do-those concerns need to be captured by the economic model.' The
present difficulty is that if all of the relevant economic and socioeconomic
variables are not incorporated in the modelfrom the beginning,it becomes
impossible to test whether the model and its results are yielding cogent
results.
Economic science could be brought to bear upon the LLRW siting
process by succinctly modeling the most relevant economic and socioeconomic aspects and then forming hypotheses about model parameters that
can be empirically tested for acceptance or rejection. One obvious null
hypothesis to form in radioactive waste management facility siting would
be whether the paradigm that leads to the chosen site conforms to our
environmental and economic justice goals. In order to test this null
hypothesis, the site must be obtained within a paradigm that incorporates
society's view of environmental and economic justice from the beginning.
This allows for a test between the model outcome and the baseline concept
of justice. If there is no baseline concept of justice in the paradigm, it is
impossible for us to measure how unjust the model results might be, and
it likewise becomes impossible for the proponents of the site to prove the
results are just. At that late date, advocates of the site cannot avoid the

11.

See, e.g., RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRNMENTAL HAZARDS: A TE FOR

DISCOURSE (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992); Nancy Brooks & Rajiv Sethi, The
Distributionof Pollution:Community Charactenstiusand Exposure to Air ToxicS, 32 J.ENVn. ECON.
MGimr. 233 (1997).
12.

See, e.g., THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS EDUCATION FUND, THE NUCLEAR WASTE

PIUME A HANDBOOK FOR CmZENS, 10-20 (1993).
13. See, e.g., Afton Associates, Inc., State of Wash. Dep't of Ecology, EnvironmentalJustice
and Title VI 12 LLW notes Supplement S-1 (July 1997).
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criticism that socioeconomic concerns had been underweighted in the
paradigm from the beginning.
For the sake of illustrating this point, consider an alternative
mechanism in which the citizens across the state came to an agreement on
several factors before a site was chosen. This agreement would decide what
size site to ultimately build, how much control and compensation the local
community would have (which implies how much the rest of society is
willing to pay for this solution) and what would constitute a fair outcome
of the process in terms of the equity in distribution of environmental costs,
benefits and risks. With this agreement in hand, the mechanism could go
forward in one of two ways: a community could be drawn at random (and
the citizens of the compact or go-alone state agree beforehand to pay
whatever is necessary for engineered barriers and lifecycle monitoring), or
geological and water surveys could be used to shorten the list of communities before one is ultimately selected. Either of these mechanisms may
result in levelized disposal costs of $1,000 per cubic foot of waste, or more;
but if the first process puts a site on the map in half the time, the discounted lifecycle total cost may be less than the cost of the current
mechanism. 4 Most importantly, this mechanism immediately lends itself
to testing the null hypothesis that the siting process outcome is just,
because our justice criterion would be a built-in feature of the siting
mechanism.
Another mechanism might operate from the notion of balancing
the distribution of potentially hazardous sites across the geographic area
in question. For example, suppose we already have three potentially
hazardous sites each in the north, south and east. If there were only two
sites in the west, the balancing mechanism would put the new site in the
west, so that each region accepts an equal share of the risk. Recognizing
that the western part of the region may not be geologically perfect for a
low-level radioactive waste site, considerable expense may accrue in
complementing the geological structure with engineered barriers.
However, in this mechanism, putting the site in another geographic
location is "expensive" in terms measured by the social concept of
environmental justice. The alternatives could be weighed by quantifying
the cost of the required engineered barriers such that the site could be
placed wherever the citizens decided.

14. In Illinois, approximately $85 million was allocated to the unsuccessful siting effort
at Martinsville alone. See VARI Ur AL, supra note 9, at 106.
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Common Language
Regardless of the siting mechanism ultimately selected by society,
the importance of a common language between affected parties is crucial.
This common language can be enhanced in the current LLRW siting
paradigm in both theoretical and practical areas. From a theoretical point
of view, an economic model of the siting conflict requires the goods and
services to be precisely defined. Practically speaking, every low-level
radioactive waste policy discussion (and every media interview) should
begin with a restatement of what differentiates low-level waste from
high-level waste.
Radioactive waste is extremely heterogeneous, consisting of more
than 200 radionuclides with corresponding half-lives measured between
seconds and millions of years.' This heterogeneity affects not only the
selection of the appropriate economic analysis to bring to bear upon the
problem but the public policy debate as well. Economic theory would
predict that a menu of waste management strategies be utilized to
correspond to the differing radioactive nuclides to be managed, and the
existing waste-type categories generally reflect this theoretical construct.
However, the current paradigm only roughly divides the nuclides into 10
sub-categories, with high-level and low-level radioactive waste being the
chief distinction.16 These broad categories do not facilitate an economic
analysis that specifies which radionuclides may optimally be managed
on-site (until their decay rates allowed for their disposal in more convenwould require off-site
tional disposal sites) and which 1radionuclides
7
disposal in more durable facilities.
Since the LLRW commodity involves several complexities, it is
important that practitioners convey as much information as possible in

15. See W. R. HARPER, BASIC PRINCIFLES OF FISSION REACTORS 222

(1961).

16. For a description of the U. S. Department of Energy classifications, see D.V. LeMone
& L. R. Jacobi, Jr., A Proposalfor Radioactive Waste Reclassification, in 3 PROC. OF THE 1993
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL

RmaDIATION 463-69 (Sept. 5-11,1993) (Prague). They advocate a reclassification of radioactive
wastes in the direction of the International Atomic Energy Agency classification system.
International differences in classifications are illustrated in INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ErNERGY
AGENcY, SAFETY SERIES NO. 111-G-1.1, CLAsSCATION OF RADIOACFIVE WASTIE (1994) (Vienna);
Helmut Rthemeyer & Ernst Wamecke, Radioactive Waste Management-The International
Approach, 59 KERNTECHNi 7 (1994) (Germany).
17. For example, the state of Texas allows disposal of radioactive waste with half-lives
lower than 300 days in more conventional disposal sites. See LeMone & Jacobi, supranote 16,
at 466-67.
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terms that are accessible to non-specialists.' Cameron and Englin illustrate
the economic importance of this point." They investigate the relationship
between a survey respondent's experience with an environmental
commodity and the respondents formation of a willingness-to-pay for the
commodity." While Cameron and Englin do not investigate preference
formation with regard to the particular commodity of radioactive waste
management, their study does indicate an inverse relationship exists
between a respondent's experience level and the conditional variance of his
willingness-to-pay valuations."' This finding has direct implications for
radioactive waste management policy. The lower the conditional variance
is for the valuations of alternative policies by affected parties, the more
reliably the compact commission or state siting authority can estimate the
types and amounts of host community compensation necessary for a fair
and economically efficient agreement.
In view of this evidence, the array of radionuclides could be
partitioned where half-lives would permit more conventional disposal
after, say, 500 years. Then, when the public hears "low-level radioactive
waste" in the news, there is no question in anyone's mind that the waste
being discussed is waste which is radioactive and too dangerous for
conventional waste disposal for a period up to 500 years, period.
After establishing a clear concept of what comprises LLRW waste,
the next communication problem regards the essential differences between
storage, disposal, treatment and management. Generally, LLRW storage
is understood to mean waste preserved in a temporary state.22 Waste
disposal is a permanent state in which the waste is not expected to be
retrieved.? Treatment technologies prepare the waste for either storage or

18. See Clark W. Bullard, Management and Control of Modern Technologies, 10 TECH. IN
Soc'Y 205 (1988) (analysis of the relationship between technological innovation and
mechanisms for disseminating information about those technologies to the institutions
designed to manage and control those technologies in particular, and to the public in general).
19. See Trudy A. Cameron & Jeffery Englin, Respondent Experience and Contingent
Valuation of Environmental Goods, 33 J.ENVTL ECON. MGMT. 296 (1997).
20. See id.
21. See id. at 310-11.
22. Note that "temporary" storage is often referred to as "interim" storage in the
literature. On-site storage possibilities are reviewed by C. H. Knauss & D. A. Gardner, On-Site
Low-Level Radwaste StorageFacility, in 3 PROC. OF THE 1993 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEmFrr AND ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDLTION 813-16. (Sept. 5-11,1993)
(Prague).
23. State-of-the-art waste disposal engineering designs are summarized by Clark W.
Bullard et al., Managing the Uncertaintiesof Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal,48 J.AIR &
WASTE MGmT. ASS'N 701, at 703-04 (1998).
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disposal." Finally, waste management is a term used to refer to storage,
disposal and treatment, all together. A new term in the waste management
debate regards the concept of assured storage. Newberry, Kerr and Leroy?
argue that this middle ground between interim storage and permanent
disposal is feasible and perhaps preferential, in view of both public opinion
over waste disposal as well as the current regulatory and economic
environment. This waste management strategy postpones the socioeconomic decisions regarding permanent disposal while taking advantage of
many of the advanced engineering features that would be used in
permanent disposal facilities.
Peer Review
The term peer review is a further example of the common language
necessary for affected parties involved in the waste management dilemma
to communicate. It is interesting that this hallmark mechanism of scientific
process is relatively underweighted in the prevailing siting paradigm in
favor of alternative investigative mechanisms such as task groups,
commissions, and adjudicative hearings. Bullard argues for the importance of peer review to the optimal management and control of modem
technologies, as a complementary mechanism to the political decision of
setting public risk and technology performance standards. The International Atomic Energy Agency also advocates peer review in the siting
process.'
The importance of peer review cannot be overstated when there are
public concerns regarding the degree to which technical experts and public
officials with a stake in siting outcomes are able to objectively interact and
maintain the public interest. Ortciger and Ayerss present an excellent

24. Waste treatment technologies are discussed in INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY, TEHNICAL REPORTS SERIES No. 360, STATUSOF TEC-NOLOGY FOR VOLUME-REDUCTION
AND THEATMENr OFILOW-LEVEL AND INTERMEDIATE-LEVEL SoUD RADIOACnVE WASTE (1994)

(Vienna).
25.

See William F. Newberry et al, Assured Storage Facilities:A New Perspectiveon LLW

Management, RADWASTE MAGAZINE, Sept. 1995, at 13.
26. See Bullard, supranote 18, at 226.
27. See INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, TECHNICAL REPORTS SERIES No. 349,
REPORT ON NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL 90-1 (1993) (Vienna).

28. See Thomas Ortciger & Michael Ayers, Managing Low-Level Radioactive Waste in a
DemocraticSociety: Requirements and Accommodations, in 2 PROC. OF THE 1993 INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION 685-92
(Sept. 5-11,1993) (Prague). They discuss the Illinois LLRW siting process as it stood in 1993.

The LLRW siting process in 1998 is largely similar, with the essential difference regarding the
addition of the volunteer community component. Special features regard the appointment of

the Task Group comprising members of several backgrounds; distribution of authority
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overview of the Illinois siting process, particularly with regard to its special
features which speak to concerns over maximum public participation and
the creation of an as objective as possible decision-making environment.
The authors argue that one of the main problems to overcome in the siting
process is "the impossibility of obtaining true impartiality by 'third-party'
groups or extra-governmental, if you will, authorities in the site selection
decisions."" The author argues, however, that a formal peer review of the
scientific evidence, as it becomes available, would seem to be an effective
way of addressing this fundamental problem they identify.
Applicability to Illinois
In an effort to enhance objectivity, the Central Midwest Compact
Commission and the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety authorized
restricted and unrestricted grants, respectively, to potential host communities for the purpose of hiring their own technical experts and legal
counsel. ® Clearly, the establishment of such grants is a step in the direction
of achieving an objective exchange of scientific opinion. However, this
mechanism generates two potential problems. Firstly, there is a difference
between blind peer review and the hiring of experts on each "side" to
exchange scientific opinions in the forum of an adjudicatory hearing. While
it is critically important to exchange scientific opinion and discuss
weaknesses in competing arguments, this latter framework of "taking
sides" in a public forum could help foster a sense that scientific research is
to be viewed through a political looking glass. As well, we might find the
quality of the scientific argument in some sense judged by the charisma of
the expert witness. In the process of blind peer review, the facts are more
likely to be weighed independent of the researcher's charisma, professional
affiliations, or political preferences.
Secondly, the making of grants to the potential host communities
begs the economic question as to the appropriate amount of grant to make.
The grants to the city of Martinsville, Illinois, totaled $625,000 per year
between 1989 and 1992, for example; however, it is not immediately clear
whether this is indeed the optimal level for the grants, or if the figure
should be $6,250 or $6.25 million.'1
Peer review is a mechanism that has engendered both a perception
and a reality of fairness in the weighing of arguments and whole para-

between the IDNS and the Task Group; and grants to potential and actual volunteer host
communities.
29. See id. at 687.
30. See VARI Er AL, supra note 9, at 104-05.
31. Id. at 105.
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digms. An alternative paradigm in which formal peer review is not a
centerpiece of the decision making is immediately weakened and put on
the defensive.
Volumetric Capacity
Finally, the economic problem of choosing the volumetric capacity
of the site is crucial to the final LLRW siting outcome. The Illinois LLRW
siting paradigm speaks to this issue by requiring annual reports from
waste generators describing not only currently generated radionuclides
and their volumes, but the generators' forecasts for the future as well.32 If,
for example, the site management contractor alone ultimately decides the
lifecycle volume of the site in the site license application, we could likely
find this to be at odds with the preferences of the waste generators and the
potential host communities. In other words, the generators' willingness to
pay at that chosen lifecycle volume may not equal the sum of the potential
host community's willingness to accept and the site management's
willingness to accept. Consider the diagram presented in Figure 1.
This diagram is a much-simplified "snapshot" of the dynamic
bargaining process for establishing a site, but it conveys the importance of
market forces upon any eventual agreement over new waste sites. The
willingness to accept (WTA) is assumed to be upward sloping, which
means that, all else equal, potential host communities and site management
contractors are more willing to accept additional waste if the compensation
is higher. The willingness to pay for off-site disposal (WTP) is assumed to
be downward sloping, indicating that, all else equal, waste generators are
less willing to ship waste for disposal as the price of disposal rises. Each
function is assumed to be continuous and monotonic so that a single
equilibrium exists. In this simple representation, the author also makes the
strong assumption that the site management contractor and the potential
host community are perfectly cooperative partners in determining the
WTA, immediately agreeing to a joint WTA.
Now, if the time period in the figure is the lifecycle of operations,
typically 30-50 years, we can see that the equilibrium total waste disposed
is given by Q* and the corresponding equilibrium disposal price is denoted
P*. That is to say, in a competitive market environment, there exists an
32. The reports are required as stated in the Illinois Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Management Act Amendments, 420 ILL. COMe.STAT. ANN. 20/4(b) (West 1998). Generator

annual totals and forecasts for the 1984-1995 period are reported in Wagner, supra note 10.
Illinois state law does require the site selection process to incorporate the most current
estimates for annual and total volumes of waste to be disposed at the facility. See Illinois

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments, 420 ILL COM.STAT. ANN.
20/10.2(c-5)(3) (West 1998).
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equilibrium price for waste disposal and an equilibrium lifecycle quantity
of waste arriving for disposal.
In reality, however, this market is not subject to typical market
forces and a number of aspects are determined in a manner which is
relatively insulated from market influence.' The prices and quantities
which result will not likely match up with the equilibrium price and
quantity which would be forthcoming in a more competitive market
environment. Consequently, there are three possible outcomes, corresponding to Q*, QH, and QL in Figure 1.

WTA

VJ
WTP

QL
Q*
QH
Quantity of waste disposal per time period
FIGURE 1
33. For example, the disposal surcharges imposed at the Barnwell disposal facility drive
a wedge between disposal price and the underlying market price. Secondly, the largest
civilian waste-generators are regulated utilities. See Michael Vincent McGinnis, Collective Bads:
The Case of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compacts, 34 NAT. RIs. J. 563 (1994). Thirdly, the
command and control aspects of state and federal laws regarding transportation, disposal and
siting of new LLRW management facilities mask underlying market price and quantity
signals.
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The base case corresponds to the unlikely event that the
out-of-market determination of lifecycle waste volume does correspond to
the competitive market solution, Q*. In this case, the amount of compensation the site management contractor and the host community are jointly
willing to accept is precisely equal to what the (aggregate) waste generators
are willing to pay.
In the second case, the lifecycle volumetric capacity is exogenously
fixed at a level lower (QJ)than the competitive market outcome, Q*. For
this smaller volume, the willingness by generators to pay is greater than the
joint willingness to accept and we have the standard bargaining situation
in which there is some surplus to share. For example, the willingness to
pay may be $750 per cubic foot and the willingness to accept may be $500
per cubic foot, and we would expect the parties to settle on an amount in
the middle in fairly quick order.
The third possibility, corresponding to Qv,is a bit more difficult to
conceptualize. If the willingness to pay is less than the joint willingness to
accept, then it is not immediately clear how the market can adjust to an
equilibrium agreement. For example, if the waste generators are willing to
pay $500 per cubic foot, but together, the site management contractor and
the host community are only willing to accept $750 per cubic foot, it is
difficult to say when the parties might reach agreement.
Agreement between the parties over time, however, is not impossible. Recall that the diagram is a static picture of a dynamic process. If the
waste generators' disposal alternatives become less attractive over time, all
else equal, their demand (WTP) for the proposed regional disposal site will
increase. Also, the site management's and host community's opportunity
costs could change with time. The hypothetical $750 willingness to accept
figure is predicated on the next best economic alternatives of both parties
at the presenttime. If their economic alternatives become less attractive, for
any number of reasons, the willingness to accept may fall over time. So in
the static case depicted in the diagram, we could have disagreement;
however, in the dynamic setting, the parties may agree to the proposed site.
III. REEVALUATING THE CURRENT ORDER OF
DECISION-MAKING
The previous section addressed particular issues that may be
underweighted in the paradigm to such an extent that progress may not be
forthcoming. A separate issue regards the optimal ordering of the issues
that will be addressed. All siting paradigms include items such as
geological and water surveys, assessments of engineered barriers,
mechanisms for determining the types of host community control and the
amount of compensation to be allocated, and a mechanism for choosing a
site management contractor. However, the failure of the LLRW siting
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paradigm to generate a single new disposal facility in the United States
begs the question as to whether the optimal siting mechanism should
specifically begin with geological surveys and end with discussions over
compensation to the host community.
To explore this point, consider the choice of when to weigh the
economic concerns that exist in any siting process. Typically, economic
concerns are weighed after a short list of sites has been selected based on
other criteria. Sometimes the list of sites is as short as one. An undesirable
result of this ordering of the issues is the unnecessary creation of significant
market power. In particular, the siting process yields market power to the
subset of communities selected for further consideration, and monopoly
power to the one "best site." Economists typically fret over the existence of
monopoly power, except in special situations, and it is virtually unheard
of to purposely create market power of any kind if it is possible to create an
alternative mechanism which preserves competitive influences. And it is
unusual to see the government mandating a process that creates market
power when usually the government is charged with breaking up market
power.
One can imagine several alternative orderings of the questions that
must be asked and solved which are more competitive in nature. The
current ordering seems appropriate if the economies of scale benefits from
regional waste disposal are more significant than the inefficiencies
generated by market power accruing to the site management contractor
and the host community. However, Bullard and Weger show that while
economies of scale benefits are evident, the benefits are bounded by the
significant variable cost of individual waste disposal canisters and vaults.
Total net social benefits from pursuing a single best site are therefore
sensitive to a host of variables, including expected lifecycle volumetric
capacity and the engineering design of the disposal facility.
A second weakness in the current ordering regards the relative
exclusion of affected citizens from the final decision over site size and price.
In the "big picture," this weakness regards the opportunity for policy
makers to educate consumers as to production costs in the long run. That
is to say, if consumers are going to be asked to pay for these improved
waste management practices, policy-makers should not miss this golden
opportunity to invite the public to better understand the production
process that generates waste and to engage in debate over the difficult
choices to be made. While siting processes generally afford opportunities
for public participation, the process should simultaneously engender a
larger debate over energy use, waste management alternatives, and what

34. See Clark W. Bullard & Hans T. Weger, LLRW Disposal: Economies of Scale and
Waste-Type Segregation, 14 ENERGY SYS. POL'Y 227 (1990).
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constitutes fairness in regard to economic and environmental justice. As
there does not appear to be an argument from economic theory to maintain
the present order of decision-making, the argument for considering
economic and social questions early (or first) in the siting process can be
made afortiori.
Another argument for beginning the process with a broader
discussion of waste management alternatives is the fact that retrievable
technology reduces the relative importance of finding a "perfect" site on
geological and geographical terms.' Technological developments have not
eliminated geological and geographic concerns by any stretch of the
imagination; however, the advanced engineering designs described by
Bullard, Weger and Wagner' are a far cry from traditional, shallow land
burial.
There are examples outside of the low-level radioactive waste
management arena of alternative ways to structure bargaining over very
difficult issues. Some bargaining arrangements favor settling issues which
can be easily agreed upon first, to build confidence between the parties and
to show third parties that progress is being made, while other processes
stack the most divisive points early in the bargaining. The U.S. Department
of Defense, for example, has implemented a decision-making mechanism
for closing selected military installations that is quite different from the
low-level radioactive waste disposal-siting paradigm." A second example
regards international bargaining over strategies to reduce the threat of
global warming.s In both of these dilemmas, there is concern similar to that
raised in the radioactive waste management dilemma that there could be
an unequal distribution of benefits between agents within the larger
outcome of gain for the group.
IV. CONCLUSION
The general failure of the current low-level radioactive waste siting
paradigm begs the question as to whether there are economic and
socioeconomic aspects of LLRW siting to consider which are either not
presently being considered or are being considered with a relatively low

35. The issue of complementarity between geological and engineered barriers is raised
by Clark W. Bullard, Issues in Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management, 37 J.AIR POLLUIION
CONTROL ASS'N 1337, at 1340 (1987).
36. See Bullard et al., supra note 23, at 703-04.
37. Some aspects of this mechanism are discussed by John J. Fialka, Pentagon Hopes Base
Closings Will Put RemainingForce at Increased Readiness,WALL ST. J., Apr. 15,1991, at B:3:1.
38. See, e.g., Marta Escapa & Maria J. Gutidrrez, Distribution of Potential Gains from
InternationalEnvironmental Agreements: The Case of the Greenhouse Effect, 33 J.ENVTL. ECON.
MGMT. 1 (1997).
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weight. While it is true that matters of environmental and economic justice,
common language, peer review and basic supply and demand analysis are
weighed within any siting paradigm, the weights given these four factors
within the current low-level radioactive waste siting paradigm are
relatively low and deserve further attention.
The long-standing problem of agreeing upon new waste management sites could result from the selected ordering of those factors in the
decision-making. As there are more ways of ordering the decisions to be
made than the number of decisions themselves, alternative orderings
should be evaluated. Experience in bargaining over other difficult
socioeconomic issues should be considered for use in making progress on
the issues which comprise the search for the socially optimal method for
managing radioactive wastes.

